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Sanctions After Mitchell 
 
 
Introduction 
Procedural rules exist to ensure that litigation is conducted efficiently and in an orderly way
1
. They 
lay down the steps that need to be taken by the parties to prepare for the resolution of their 
dispute, whether by negotiated settlement or trial. In England and Wales the procedural steps that 
have to be followed in litigation are laid down in a combination of the pre-action protocols, the CPR, 
practice directions and in case management directions made in individual cases by the court. Any 
system of justice needs to have appropriate powers to ensure that parties keep to the timetable and 
ensure they are ready for trial when the time comes. Failure to enforce compliance results in delay, 
expense and vexation. The system of sanctions is the method used to combat these problems. 
 
Procedural defaults vary widely in their seriousness and consequences. Filing a document one 
minute after a deadline is far less serious and has less impact on the civil justice system than not 
being ready for trial resulting in the loss of a trial date. Defaults also vary considerably in their 
blameworthiness. Missing a deadline by a minute may be due to pure incompetence, whereas not 
being ready for trial may be due to illness or other circumstances outside the control of the party. 
 
Approaches to dealing with procedural default have varied over the years
2
. Before the Judicature 
Acts 1873-75 English procedure was dominated by form and technicality, with as many cases being 
defeated on points of procedure as were decided on their merits
3
. An overly formalistic approach 
encouraged interim applications taking technical points, which lead to congestion in the courts, 
delays, and parties with meritorious cases being deprived of justice. This was swept away in 1875, 
and replaced by a system designed to ensure that procedure was subordinated to the interests of 
justice. Under the Rules of the Supreme Court any failure to comply with the requirements of the 
rules was treated as an irregularity and did not nullify the proceedings or any step taken in the 
proceedings
4
. The interests of justice were primarily served by deciding cases on their merits. "The 
principle obviously is that unless and until the court has pronounced a judgment upon the merits or 
by consent, it is to have the power to revoke the expression of its coercive power where that has 
only been obtained by a failure to follow any of the rules of procedure."
5
 This resulted in an 
extremely restrictive approach to dismissal for want of prosecution
6
, and encouraged a climate of 
letting sleeping dogs lie
7
 when a claim became inactive because taking steps to enforce compliance 
might provoke the claimant into making further progress with the claim, with any default being 
readily forgiven. 
 
Introduction of the CPR should have resulted in far more active judicial intervention to prevent non-
compliance with procedural timetables. As explained by Professor Zuckerman
8
, even the original 
version of the overriding objective introduced a three-dimensional approach to the concept of 
justice, comprising: 
                                                          
1
 For litigation in England and Wales this is laid down by the overriding objective in the Civil Procedure Rules 
1998, SI 1998/3123 ("CPR"), r 1.1(1) as amended. This provides that the overriding objective of the CPR is to 
enable the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. 
2
 Adrian Zuckerman, "The revised CPR 3.9: a coded message demanding articulation"[2013] CJQ 123 at 126. 
3
 W.B. Odgers, "Changes in Procedure and in the Law of Evidence" in A Century of Law Reform (1901) 203. 
4
 Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, SI 1965/1776 ("RSC"), order 2, r 1(1), replacing similar provisions in earlier 
versions of the rules. The equivalent provision in the CPR is r 3.10. 
5
 Lord Atkin in Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473 at 480. 
6
 The principles were laid down in Birkett v James [1978] AC 297. 
7
 Lord Salmon in Birkett v James said this was perfectly permissible. 
8
 Adrian Zuckerman, "The revised CPR 3.9: a coded message demanding articulation"[2013] CJQ 123 at 128-9. 
 (a) Merits. An essential part of the court's function is to arrive at a correct decision in 
accordance with the law and evidence
9
; 
(b) Time. Dealing with disputes expeditiously
10
 is one of the imperatives of the overriding 
objective, and reflects the venerable aphorism that justice delayed is justice denied; and 
(c) Resources. Dealing with a case justly includes saving expense and dealing with it in ways that 
are proportionate to what is at stake, and allotting to it an appropriate share of the court's 
resources
11
. 
 
Since the CPR came into force in April 1999 the courts have had a duty to manage cases actively
12
, 
and parties have been under a duty to help the court in furthering the overriding objective
13
. In 
doing so the court has to balance the three dimensions laid down by the overriding objective 
without giving one of them undue weight
14
. Despite initial good intentions, and despite dispelling 
the idea of letting sleeping dogs lie
15
, in practice the courts tolerated repeated breaches of 
directions, which resulted in a proliferation of interim applications and appeals over the 
consequences of non-compliance. Unless a fair trial was no longer possible
16
, or if there were 
repeated breaches amounting to a total disregard of court orders
17
, cases were rarely struck out for 
procedural default
18
. A slack approach to compliance with procedural orders was recognised by Sir 
Rupert Jackson
19
 as a driver of excessive litigation costs. 
 
To combat this Sir Rupert Jackson recommended that judges should take a more robust approach to 
case management, and make sure that realistic timetables are observed
20
. A key component of this 
approach was the replacement of CPR, r 3.9, with effect from 1 April 2013. Whether the new r 3.9 
achieves it intended objectives and effects the right balance between the three elements of justice 
set out above must be open to question. 
 
Rule 3.9: Relief from Sanctions 
With effect from 1 April 2013, relief from sanctions is governed by CPR, r 3.9 which is in the 
following terms: 
 
'On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice 
direction or court order, the court will consider all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to 
deal justly with the application, including the need— 
 
(a) for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and 
                                                          
9
 CPR, r 1.1(1) and 1.1(2)(d). 
10
 CPR, r 1.1(2)(d). 
11
 CPR, r 1.1(2)(b), (c) and (e). 
12
 CPR, r 1.4; Robert Turner, "'Actively': the word that changed the civil courts" in The Civil Procedure Rules Ten 
Years On, ed Deidre Dwyer (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 77-88. 
13
 CPR, r 1.3. 
14
 Holmes v SGB Services plc [2001] EWCA Civ 354 at [38], per Buxton LJ. 
15
 Blackstone's Guide to the Civil Procedure Rules 2nd ed (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 174; PD 28, para 5 (fast track) 
and PD 29, para 7 (multi-track); Khalili v Bennett [2000] EMLR 996. 
16
 Taylor v Anderson [2002] EWCA Civ 1680. While a considerable risk of not achieving a fair trial was relevant 
on an application to strike out for delay, it was regarded as not applicable on an application for relief from 
sanctions (Hansom v E Rex Makin & Co [2003] EWCA Civ 1801). 
17
For example, UCB Corporate Services Ltd v Halifax (SW) Ltd [1999] CPLR 691. 
18
 See the cases cited in Blackstone's Civil Practice 2013 (Oxford: OUP, 2013) chapter 46, and in particular at 
paras 46.12 to 46.28. 
19
 Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (2009), chapter 39. 
20
 Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report, Executive Summary para 6.8. 
(b) to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.' 
 
As pointed out by Professor Zuckerman
21
, in itself this rule says very little that is not already stated in 
the overriding objective as set out in r 1.1, or which goes without saying in that it is obvious that 
rules, practice directions and orders are made with the intention that they should be complied with. 
Lurking within the rule was a code waiting to be unlocked by the Court of Appeal. 
 
The current rule 3.9 replaced the version introduced with the CPR in April 1999. As originally 
enacted, the rule spelt out nine factors that the court had to take into account when considering all 
the circumstances of the case in an application for relief from sanctions
22
. Early authorities on the 
original version of r 3.9(1) held it was essential for the judge to consider each of the factors listed in r 
3.9(1) systematically, and then to weigh the various factors in deciding whether granting relief would 
accord with the overriding objective
23
. This formalistic approach was disapproved by Khatib v Ramco 
International
24
, where it was said the judge has to identify the factors from the r 3.9(1) list that are 
relevant to the circumstances of the particular case, and conduct an appropriate review and 
balancing exercise. 
 
With a list of nine relevant factors, almost inevitably some would favour granting relief, and others 
would militate against relief. While the courts disavowed the temptation to indulge in simple head-
counting
25
, and insisted it was necessary to assess the significance and weight of all the relevant 
circumstances, there would almost always be reasons why relief should be granted. Part of the 
problem was that the list of factors was too long, leading to information overload, and damaging 
decision-making
26
. Also contributing to the problem was the failure to prioritise the factors set out in 
the rule, and the underlying culture that the interests of justice can best be satisfied by deciding 
cases on the merits with scant regard to the other two dimensions of time and resources. 
 
The new rule 3.9 sweeps away the old nine factors, and replaces them with two concepts: the need 
for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and the need to comply with the 
timetable for the case. One of the objectives was plainly to remove the checklist approach to 
                                                          
21
 Adrian Zuckerman, "The revised CPR 3.9: a coded message demanding articulation"[2013] CJQ 123 at 124-5. 
22
 In its original form, r 3.9(1) provided: "On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to 
comply with any rule, practice direction or court order the court will consider all the circumstances including- 
(a) the interests of the administration of justice; 
(b) whether the application for relief has been made promptly; 
(c) whether the failure to comply was intentional; 
(d) whether there is a good explanation for the failure; 
(e) the extent to which the party in default has complied with other rules, practice directions, court orders and 
any relevant pre-action protocol; 
(f) whether the failure to comply was caused by the party or his legal representative; 
(g) whether the trial date or the likely trial date can still be met if relief is granted; 
(h) the effect which the failure to comply had on each party; and 
(i) the effect which the granting of relief would have on each party." 
23
 Woodhouse v Consignia plc [2002] EWCA Civ 275, [2002] 1 WLR 2558 and RC Residuals Ltd v Linton Fuel Oils 
Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 911, [2002] 1 WLR 2782. 
24
 [2011] EWCA Civ 605, [2011] CP Rep 35. 
25
 Hansom v E Rex Makin & Co [2003] EWCA Civ 1801 at [20]; Fred Perry (Holdings) Ltd v Brands Plaza Trading 
Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 224, [2012] FSR 28 at [18]. 
26
 Inbar Levy, "Lightening the overload of CPR Rule 3.9" [2013] CJQ 139. A three-factor test had been proposed 
by Andrew Higgins in "The costs of case management: what should be done post-Jackson?" [201] CJQ 317, 
namely (1) whether granting relief would prejudice the other parties' right to a fair trial; (2) whether granting 
relief would result in the court allocating disproportionate resources to the dispute; and (3) whether there was 
a good reason for the failure to comply. 
applications for relief from sanctions, and to free the courts from the growing jurisprudence on the 
old nine factors. Another was to set out the two primary considerations that have to be considered 
on applications for relief from sanctions. Courts are still required to consider all the circumstances of 
the case, but are now given clear guidance that efficient and proportionate conduct together with 
compliance with rules must weigh most heavily when balancing all the relevant circumstances. 
 
It is also plain that the new rule 3.9 was intended to implement recommendation 86 from the 
Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report. This said: 
 
"The courts should be less tolerant than hitherto of unjustified delays and breaches of orders. This 
change of emphasis should be signalled by amendment of CPR rule 3.9. If and in so far as it is 
possible, courts should monitor the progress of the parties in order to secure compliance with 
orders and pre-empt the need for sanctions." 
 
In discussing the enforcement of rules and directions, Sir Rupert set out the following conclusions
27
: 
 
"First, the courts should set realistic timetables for cases and not impossibly tough timetables in 
order to give the impression of firmness. Secondly, courts at all levels have become too tolerant of 
delays and non-compliance with orders. In doing so they have lost sight of the damage which the 
culture of delay and non-compliance is inflicting upon the civil justice system. The balance therefore 
needs to be redressed
28
. However, I do not advocate the extreme course which was canvassed as 
one possibility in [the Preliminary Report] or any approach of that nature." 
 
Sir Rupert went on to suggest a form of words for the new rule 3.9 which are similar to the new rule 
as enacted
29
. His version had an identical para (a), but instead of para (b) on the need to enforce 
compliance with rules, practice directions and orders, required the court to consider "the interests 
of justice in the particular case." Sir Rupert's draft rule therefore balanced the "time" and 
"resources" factors in his para (a) with the interests of justice factor in his para (b). As enacted, rule 
3.9 has the interests of justice factor in the main part of rule 3.9(1), the "time" and "resources" 
factors in para (a), and a new emphasis on compliance with rules for its own sake in para (b). It may 
be that the rule as enacted was intended to effect a hardening of attitudes to rule compliance.  
 
The "extreme course" referred to in the Final Report was that non-compliance with the rules or 
directions would not be tolerated except if there were "exceptional circumstances"
30
. As will be 
seen, the Court of Appeal has come very close to laying down a principle that adopts this extreme 
course. 
 
 
Pre-Mitchell Decisions 
Predictably, there were a considerable number of mostly first instance and High Court decisions on 
the new CPR, r 3.9 in the six months after the rule came into force. They are likely to be regarded as 
mainly being of historical interest given the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Mitchell v News 
                                                          
27
 Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report, para 39.6.5. 
28
 This new approach was referred to in a number of Court of Appeal decisions before 1 April 2013. An 
example is Fred Perry (Holdings) Ltd v Brands Plaza Trading [2012] EWCA Civ 224, [2012] FSR 28, per Lewison 
LJ, who specifically adopted the words set out in the quotation from the Final Report. 
29
 At para 39.6.7. Lord Dyson M.R. in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537 at [35] 
appears to have thought that the draft rule 3.9 in the Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report, para 39.6.7 
was the same as r 3.9 as enacted. 
30
 Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report (2009), para 43.4.21. 
Group Newspapers Ltd.   First in time is Murray v Dowlman
31
 where the claimant's costs budget 
under the pilot scheme in PD 51G mistakenly omitted to include the CFA success fee and ATE 
premiums. The error amounted to failing to tick a box on the form, a box that was not included in 
the costs budget forms that were introduced on 1 April 2013. Relief to rectify the error was granted. 
Next was Venulum Property Investments Ltd v Space Architecture Ltd
32
 where the claim form was 
served on the final day of its validity. This meant that the particulars of claim had to be served at the 
same time
33
, but the claimant's solicitors mistakenly believed they had another 14 days to do so. 
Edwards-Stuart J in his judgment addressed each of the old r 3.9(1) factors in turn
34
, and concluded 
that they were fairly evenly balanced
35
. Relief was refused partly because of factors not on the old r 
3.9 list, such as pre-issue delay, the strength of the case, and what the judge described as vague 
pleading, together with the stricter approach required under the civil justice reforms of 2013. 
 
In Wyche v Careforce Group plc
36
 there was a failure to comply with an unless order for disclosure 
through failing to carry out one of the keyword searches ordered by the court, and through 
miscategorising other documents as privileged when they were not. A total of 89 documents were 
therefore disclosed late in a substantial case involving thousands of documents. Relief was granted 
under r 3.9, the judge commenting that allowance had to be made for human error, that the 
mistakes had been rectified and had been unintentional. This decision was criticised as not 
amounting to a good reason by the Master of the Rolls in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd
37
, 
and should not have resulted in relief from the sanction unless the breach was trivial. 
 
Thavatheva v Riordan (No 1)
38
 proceeded on the basis that there had been serious failures to comply 
with disclosure obligations under the terms of an unless order, and relief was refused. The judge said 
that although the checklist of factors under r 3.9 had been removed, they continued to be matters 
which needed to be considered as they enabled the court to assess whether relief from sanctions 
would be appropriate under the new r 3.9. The same point about the continuing relevance of the old 
checklist was made in Rayyan Iraq Co Ltd v Trans Victory Marine Inc
39
, where particulars of claim 
were served two days late. The court criticised the defendant for seeking to take advantage of the 
error, and granted relief because refusing to do so would have been disproportionate and given the 
defendant an unjustified windfall. These two cases, together with Venulum Property Investments Ltd 
v Space Architecture Ltd
40
 go too far in applying the old r 3.9(1) factors
41
. Depending on the facts it 
may be appropriate to consider some or even all the old factors as part of "all the circumstances of 
the case", while giving due weight to the two factors set out in the new r 3.9(1). 
 
Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Dinler
42
 was an example of multiple breaches of court directions. The 
claimant failed to file a pre-trial checklist in time or to pay listing or hearing fees. He served his 
witness statements 27 days late, failed to attempt to agree the trial bundle, and lodged it on the day 
before the trial rather than 7 days before as directed. The trial judge simply imposed a costs 
sanction. On appeal Swift J noted that the trial judge had failed to undertake a balance of factors 
                                                          
31
 [2013] EWHC 872 (TCC). 
32
 [2013] EWHC 1242 (TCC). 
33
 This is the effect of CPR, rr 7.4(2) and 7.5(1), supplanting the usual 14 day rule in r 7.4(1). 
34
 At [36] to [44]. 
35
 At [47]. 
36
 [2013] EWHC 3282 Comm), Walker J. 
37
 [2013] EWCA Civ 1477 at [48]. 
38
 Hildyard J, 9 August 2013. 
39
 [2013] EWHC 2696 (Comm), Andrew Smith J. This decision was criticised in Mitchell v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd at [50]-[51] for placing too much emphasis on doing justice between the parties. 
40
 Supra. 
41
 Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd at [49]. 
42
 Swift J, 10 October 2013. 
approach, and that under the new r 3.9 the court was required to consider wider issues of court time 
and resources. This was a case of flagrant disregard of court orders and requirements set out in the 
rules, and relief from the automatic striking out in CPR, r 3.7(4) for non-payment of fees was refused. 
 
In Thavatheva v Riordan (No 2)
43
 the defaulting party made a second application for relief from 
sanctions under r 3.9, producing evidence that they had been misled by their former solicitors into 
believing that the solicitors had complied with the unless order. Relief was granted by the first 
instance judge on the basis that there was no evidence the solicitors had wilfully not complied with 
the original order, which amounted to a material change of circumstances. This was regarded as 
wrong in principle by Richards LJ in the Court of Appeal as lacking the robustness demanded by 
Mitchell v News Group Newspapers. The first instance judge varied the original order under r 3.1(7), 
which provides a general power to vary or revoke previous orders. This part of the decision was 
reversed in the Court of Appeal for varying the order under r 3.1(7) far too readily, and for 
wrongfully treating late compliance with the original order as a change in circumstances. 
 
Kesabo v African Barrick Gold plc
44
, like Venulum Property Investments Ltd v Space Architecture Ltd
45
, 
was a case where the claim form was served close to the end of its period of validity, but in this case 
the particulars of claim were served 16 hours late. Simon J applied the two main factors set out in 
the new r 3.9(1), commenting that the new factors do not require any further elaboration or 
refinement. He also said that some of the criteria from the old r 3.9(1) might be relevant in 
considering all the circumstances of the case, although they should not be applied in a formalistic 
way. Given the short period of breach, relief was granted. The final case in the series is Boyle v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
46
, which was a Court of Appeal decision under the old r 3.9. 
An expert's report was served one working day before the trial, and no explanation was given for the 
delay. Relief was refused, a decision that was upheld in the Court of Appeal. Livermore LJ at [11] 
commented that: 
 
"There is the further important consideration that, as must now be well known, the courts are 
becoming less and less tolerant of failure to serve expert evidence in accordance with previous 
orders of the court, just as they are becoming less and less tolerant of other breaches of court 
orders. It is not merely prejudice to the parties that matters. There is prejudice to the system of 
justice as a whole and, in particular, to waiting litigants if their cases are to be deferred because of 
delays in litigation currently before the court. ... As the judge in this case said, any court is reluctant 
to see a catastrophically injured claimant go uncompensated, but there has to be a clear message 
that prolonged and persistent failures to comply with court orders may well result in cases being 
dismissed." 
 
Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd 
On 19 September 2012, at approximately 7.30pm, Mr Andrew Mitchell M.P., at the time the 
Government Chief Whip, left his office at 9 Downing Street in order to cycle home. His exchange 
with the police officers at the entrance to Downing Street became instantly notorious, and widely 
known as "plebgate". An article published by the defendant newspaper two days later was the 
subject of defamation proceedings brought by Mr Mitchell. PD 51D, the defamation proceedings 
costs management pilot scheme, applied to the proceedings. This provided that the parties had to 
                                                          
43
 [2013] EWHC 3179 (Ch), Andrew Sutcliffe QC, reversed after the decision in Mitchell v News Group 
Newspapers [2013] EWCA Civ 1537 by the Court of Appeal at [2014] EWCA Civ 15. 
44
 [2013] EWHC 3198 (QB). 
45
 [2013] EWHC 1242 (TCC). 
46
 [2013] EWCA Civ 1477. There are problems with the substantive and evidence law issues in this case, which 
are beyond the scope of this article. 
discuss the assumptions and the timetable upon which their costs budgets were based
47
, and had to 
exchange and lodge their costs budgets not less than 7 days before the hearing for which the costs 
budgets were required
48
. 
 
On Wednesday 5 June 2013 the court issued an order convening a case management conference 
and costs budget hearing for Monday 10 June 2013. This failed to give the minimum 3 days' notice 
required for case management conferences
49
, let alone enough time to lodge costs budgets 7 days in 
advance of the hearing. The hearing was relisted for 18 June 2013, it not being clear from the 
judgment when notice of the relisted hearing was given, but Master McCloud's judgment seems to 
indicate this was on Friday 7 June 2013
50
. Given that periods expressed in the CPR, practice 
directions and court orders mean clear days
51
, this meant that costs budgets had to be exchanged 
and filed by Monday 10 June 2013. Technically this allowed only one working day to discuss 
budgetary assumptions, prepare, exchange and file costs budgets in a case where each party's costs 
were about £500,000. 
 
Rule 2.8(2) seems to have been overlooked by the Master and the Court of Appeal. At [60] and [61] 
of her judgment the Master said: 
 
"60. I have given close consideration to the amount of time which the Claimant had to produce his 
budget. Was there procedural unfairness? On the face of it 4 days is short and even shorter when 
one considers that two days were weekend days. But having considered this carefully, because it 
was a point which troubled me, the view I have taken is that the parties were well aware that this 
was a case for which budgeting would be required from the start and that the mere fact that a date 
is set for CMC is not supposed to be the starting gun for proper consideration of budgeting. 
 
61. Budgeting is something which all solicitors by now ought to know is intended to be integral to 
the process from the start, and it ought not to be especially onerous to prepare a final budget for a 
CMC even at relatively short notice if proper planning has been done. The very fact that the 
Defendants, using cost lawyers, were well able to deal with this in the time allotted highlights that 
there is no question of the time being plainly too short or unfairly so." 
 
In the event by engaging outside costs lawyers the defendant filed its costs budget on 11 June 2013. 
Technically this was one day late
52
. No point has been made about that. It appears that the 
defendant may have attempted to engage in discussions on budgetary assumptions after filing its 
budget
53
, which was also technically a breach of PD 51D, para 4.1, which required the discussions to 
take place during the preparation of the costs budgets, not after they were filed. 
 
On the claimant's side, the evidence was that work started on the costs budget on 10 June, that 
counsel sent figures on 13 June, that a draft budget was sent to chambers on 14 June, but that 
nothing was communicated to the court until 17 June 2013 after the Master sent an email chasing 
the situation. The response indicated that the delay was caused by the need to chase counsels' 
                                                          
47
 PD 51D, para 4.1. 
48
 PD 51D, para 4.2. 
49
 PD 29, para 3.7. 
50
 [2013] EWHC 2355 (QB) at [37]. 
51
 CPR, r 2.8(2). 
52
 Master McCloud at [2013] EWHC 2355 (QB), [38], commented that filing on 11 June 2013 was in compliance 
with the rules. 
53
 [2013] EWHC 2355 (QB) at [38]. At [2013] EWCA Civ 1537, [54], Lord Dyson MR said there was no specific 
evidence to support the Master's finding that the defendant's solicitor had sought to engage in budget 
assumption discussions. 
figures. A costs budget was filed later on 17 June. When the case came before Master McCloud on 
18 June 2013 it transpired that the real reason for the delay was a combination of the senior 
associate solicitor who usually did the costs budgeting having left the firm, and the other fee earners 
with conduct of the case being heavily engaged on another case, with three different hearings in 
that week as well as a substantial statement of case to prepare. As the Master put it, the firm was 
"stretched very thin in terms of resources"
54
. She said the excuses put forward by the claimant's 
solicitors were not unusual: "pressures of work, a small firm, unexpected delays with counsel and so 
on"
55
, but these amounted to no good excuse for the default
56
. 
 
On 18 June 2013 Master McCloud decided
57
 that there had been an absolute failure by the claimant 
to engage in discussions over budgetary assumptions, as well as the failure to exchange and file the 
claimant's costs budget until the day before the case management conference. She therefore 
imposed a sanction of treating the claimant as having filed a costs budget limited to court fees. On 
25 July 2013 Master McCloud heard an application for relief from that sanction. There being 
objections from Mr Mitchell's side to a long wait, the Master needed to vacate a half day in her list 
which had been pre-allocated to deal with claims by persons affected by asbestos related diseases. 
As Master McCloud explained
58
, there is an expedited list for such claims because life expectancies in 
these cases are often very short. It is hard to understand why the relief from sanctions application 
justified vacating the appointments in the asbestos related claims. Nevertheless, it illustrates the 
fact that any application dealing with the consequences of non-compliance has an impact on other, 
probably more deserving, cases awaiting adjudication. The Master emphasised the importance 
attached to rule compliance following the civil justice reforms of 2013
59
, and decided it would not be 
just to grant relief from the sanction imposed on 18 June 2013
60
. 
 
In the Court of Appeal it was held that the Master was entitled to apply the sanction laid down by 
CPR, r 3.14, to disallow the claimant's costs other than court fees, by analogy
61
. Although there was 
no equivalent sanction provision in PD 51D, this sanction represented the considered view of the 
Civil Procedure Rule Committee as to what constituted a proportionate sanction for failure to file a 
costs budget in time unless the court ordered otherwise. A court should only order otherwise in 
most cases on the same grounds as are relevant to a decision to grant relief from sanctions under r 
3.9
62
. This is of course a legitimate reading of r 3.14. Another interpretation of the rule is that the 
sanction set out in r 3.14 is intended to have a coercive effect (rather like committal for contempt), 
which is partly to punish, and partly to encourage compliance, so that the draconian effect can be 
adjusted once compliance has been achieved. That is not the way the Court of Appeal has 
approached the position. It almost certainly means that all the other sanctions set out in the CPR are 
also to be taken as the considered view of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee as to what constitutes 
proportionate sanctions for the relevant instances of non-compliance. 
 
It was further held that the sanction in r 3.14 applies both to situations where a party fails to file a 
costs budget at all and also where a party files a costs budget late. The mischief addressed by rr 3.13 
and 3.14 is the last-minute filing of costs budgets
63
. A court cannot manage the litigation and the 
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costs to be incurred unless costs budgets are filed in good time before the first case management 
conference. Lord Dyson, MR, at [30] makes a comment to the effect that under the main costs 
budgeting provisions that came into force on 1 April 2013 the need to discuss budgetary 
assumptions and the timetable is also an important requirement. This was an obligation under PD 
51D, para 4.1, but it has not been included either in CPR rr 3.12 to 3.18 or PD 3E. 
 
Relief from Sanctions: the Mitchell Principles 
The Court of Appeal in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd
64
 intended to send out a clear 
message that the civil justice reforms of 2013 have brought in a new robust approach to rule 
compliance. Rather than focussing on the interests of justice in the individual case, there is a shift to 
recognising the time and resources dimensions of administering civil justice. This means that 
importance has to be attached to the needs and interests of all court users when case managing 
individual cases. As Lord Dyson MR pointed out at [39], if the claimant had complied with the costs 
budgeting requirements in PD 51D the costs management aspects of the case would have been dealt 
with in less than an hour on 18 June 2013. Non-compliance meant that the hearing on 18 June was 
abortive, and a further half-day was devoted to the hearing for relief from the sanction which could 
have been better used in managing the asbestos related disease claims. To stop the haemorrhaging 
of court resources and costs on satellite litigation over procedure a tough approach was needed to 
the problem of non-compliance. Once it is well understood that the courts will adopt a firm line on 
enforcement, the expectation is that litigation will be conducted in a more disciplined manner, and 
the need for satellite litigation over non-compliance will be reduced
65
. 
 
Accordingly, on an application for relief from sanctions the following principles apply: 
 
(1) the court must consider "all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with 
the application"
66
. This means that the court: 
(a) must apply the overriding objective; and 
(b) must perform a balancing exercise taking into account the factors relevant to the 
application
67
. 
 
(2) the two most important factors are
68
: 
(a) the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and 
(b) the need to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders. 
 
(3) relief from sanctions is unlikely to be granted unless either:  
(a) the breach is trivial and the application for relief is made promptly
69
; or 
(b)  there is a good reason or the non-compliance
70
, the burden being on the defaulting party to 
persuade the court to grant relief
71
. 
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 It will usually be appropriate to start by considering the nature of the non-compliance
72
. Examples of 
trivial breaches suggested by Lord Dyson MR included instances of failures of form rather than 
substance, and cases where a deadline has been narrowly missed. 
 
A good reason for non-compliance is most likely to arise from circumstances outside the control of 
the party in default
73
. Examples given by the Master of the Rolls
74
 included cases where the party or 
its solicitor suffered a debilitating illness or was involved in an accident. There may also be a good 
reason if later developments in the claim show that the period for compliance originally imposed 
was unreasonable
75
. 
 
Bad reasons identified by the Master of the Rolls included overlooking a deadline and failing to meet 
a deadline through other pressures of work
76
. Solicitors cannot take on too much work and expect to 
be relieved from sanctions if they fail to meet deadlines. Either they should refuse the work, or they 
should delegate the work to other fee earners in the firm. The need to conduct litigation efficiently 
means there can be no relaxation in the approach to rule compliance. 
 
Original Sanction too Harsh 
It is impermissible on an application for relief from sanctions to argue that the sanction imposed 
under an unless order is too harsh. If there is any legitimate complaint about the seriousness of the 
sanction, the correct course is to appeal against the original order
77
 or, exceptionally, by asking the 
court which made the original order to vary or revoke it under CPR, r 3.1(7)
78
. An application for 
relief from sanctions presupposes that the sanction was in principle properly imposed. 
 
Application to Vary or Revoke the Original Order 
Applications to vary or revoke orders under CPR, r 3.1(7) are governed by the principles in Tibbles v 
SIG plc
79
.  Upholding the finality of decisions, avoiding giving litigants a second bite of the cherry, and 
supporting the appeals system all point towards a restrictive approach to applications under r 3.1(7). 
Accordingly, a court will normally only vary or revoke an earlier order if: 
 
(a) there has been a material change of circumstances; or 
(b) the facts on which the original order was made were misstated; or 
(c) there was a manifest mistake on the part of the judge in formulating the original order. 
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If an application for relief from sanctions is combined with an application to vary or revoke the 
original order under r 3.1(7), the proper course is to consider the application under r 3.1(7) first, 
applying the Tibbles v SIG plc principles. If that application succeeds, there may be no breach and no 
sanction to be relieved. If the r 3.1(7) application is unsuccessful, the application for relief under r 
3.9 has to proceed on the basis the original sanction was properly imposed. 
 
The Decision 
On the facts in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd the claimant's solicitors missed the deadline 
primarily through pressures of work. There was no evidence of any prejudice to the claimant, and a 
direct impact on court resources and other litigants. There were two breaches (not discussing 
budgetary assumptions and late filing of the costs budget), both of which were important, so this 
was not a trivial breach case. There was no good reason for the breach. While the Master might have 
imposed a less draconian penalty, for example through disallowing part of the claimant's costs 
rather than all his costs other than court fees, the sanction imposed was the one stipulated by r 3.14. 
There was no basis for interfering with the Master's decision, and the appeal was dismissed. 
 
Lord Dyson MR recognised that the decision might be regarded as harsh
80
. It is. It is also a neat use 
of a sophisticated lawyer's device to say so expressly, because experience shows this is an effective 
way to defuse criticism. To some extent a strong decision was necessary in order to bring home to 
the profession that the courts are serious about the change in culture brought in by the civil justice 
reforms 2013, which include greater emphasis on compliance with litigation timetables. 
 
There are a number of serious procedural concerns about the decision:  
 
(a) While it recognised that the time given to the parties to prepare their costs budgets was short, 
the decision proceeds on the basis that the time given was adequate. Sir Rupert Jackson said a 
necessary precondition for tough case management was that the court should set realistic 
timetables
81
. One working day is not a reasonable time to comply with a requirement to file a costs 
budget in a substantial case. The courts have to keep to their obligations in setting realistic deadlines 
if a tough approach is to be workable. 
 
(b) Parties are not always able to fund whatever expenses are thrown at them. In this case the 
defendant was the publisher of a stable of national newspapers, and was able to afford to engage 
outside costs lawyers to compile its costs budget over the weekend and the next two working days. 
The court took the fact that the newspaper had achieved this as meaning it was reasonable for the 
claimant's solicitors to do the same
82
. This is to assume parties are on an equal footing, whereas the 
overriding objective includes ensuring the parties are on an equal footing, which is a very different 
thing. 
 
(c) Needing to throw money at cases in order to meet tight deadlines is the exact opposite of the 
purpose of the civil justice reforms 2013, which is to promote access to justice at proportionate cost. 
The "resource" dimension includes the costs incurred by the parties. 
 
(d) Costs management is only worth doing if the additional costs of producing costs budgets  and 
costs management result in overall savings through better management of the claim
83
. Forcing the 
pace on this will add to the cost of the process. 
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 (e) Costs are only recoverable from the other side if they are necessary (as well as being reasonable 
and proportionate). Paragraph 61 of the Master's judgment
84
 assumes that work on costs budgets 
should have been started before being notified of the case management conference. The usual 
argument on detailed assessments is that premature work is not necessary, and should be 
disallowed on that basis. 
 
(f) It was assumed that the sanction in CPR, r 3.14, was the considered view of the Civil Procedure 
Rule Committee as to what constitutes a proportionate sanction for breach of the requirement to 
file costs budgets. This is not borne out by a comparison of sanctions for different types of breach 
set out in the CPR, a subject which is considered further below. 
 
(g) There is a lack of clarity over how the principles enunciated in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers 
Ltd fit together. In the formulation set out above it has been assumed that the test is that the court 
must consider all the circumstances of the case so as to deal with the application justly (following 
the wording of r 3.9(1)), with the other principles (the two factors set out in the rule, and the trivial 
breach and good reason principles laid down by the Court of Appeal) being matters to be weighed in 
deciding what is just. The trivial breach and good reason principles alternatively could be considered 
to be pre-conditions to be established before the court proceeds to the balancing exercise. This will 
no doubt be clarified in due course by the Court of Appeal. As a further alternative, the trivial breach 
and good reason principles may be intended to be practical guidance to first instance courts in 
deciding what it is just in all the circumstances. In other words, these principles are the relevant 
"circumstances" that have to be considered under r 3.9(1)
85
.  
 
(h) The effect of the decision was to impose in effect reverse one-way costs shifting on the claimant 
in a defamation claim. This is the complete opposite of what Sir Rupert Jackson had in mind for 
defamation claims in the Final Report, recommendation 65
86
.  
 
(i) If Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd is correct, then a large number of provisions in the CPR 
and practice directions will need to be amended to fit in with it. This covers prescribed sanctions 
that are not proportionate to other sanctions, and also provisions laying down tests for things like 
setting aside default judgments, amendment of statements of case, extending time under r 3.1(2)(a), 
rectifying errors of procedure under r 3.10, adjourning trials, and setting aside after non-attendance, 
that do not fit with the principles laid down by the Court of Appeal
87
. A similar exercise had to be 
undertaken after the Court of Appeal decided that the deemed service rules in the CPR created an 
irrebuttable presumption of law
88
. An alternative view is that Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd 
is wrong because it is inconsistent with the scheme of the CPR. 
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(j) Adopting a restrictive view on what amounts to a "good reason" means the Court of Appeal has 
laid down an approach to non-compliance which is indistinguishable from the "extreme course" 
rejected by Sir Rupert Jackson (no relief unless there are exceptional circumstances). 
 
(k) An unforgiving attitude to procedural default
89
 probably means the end of party co-operation as 
part of the overriding objective. Why should a party try to help solve a situation when an opponent 
gets into difficulties when they know the court will impose tough sanctions? 
 
(l) Perhaps the most worrying aspect of the decision is that it seems to give undue precedence to 
resource considerations. Justice, time and resources should be held in balance. While the principles 
laid down include dealing with the application justly, the effective requirements that will govern the 
great majority of applications are whether the breach was trivial and whether there was a good 
reason for the default. The way these have been defined
90
 means that very few applications will 
succeed. That may be a good thing from a court management point of view. Combined with points 
(a) to (c) above, unless they are addressed, the danger is that a large number of meritorious claims 
will be struck out or hamstrung through sanctions dealing with evidence for technical defaults.    
 
Also of concern is that procedural defaults will be treated more harshly than errors that look like 
errors of procedure but which are governed by statutory provisions.  Examples are the discretionary 
powers to allow claims to proceed despite not meeting the primary limitation period
91
, and 
amendments that involve making new claims
92
. 
 
Early Post-Mitchell Decisions 
Durrant v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset
93
 applied Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd in 
an appeal by a claimant against a decision granting relief against sanctions in a case where the 
defendant was late in serving its witness statements. A total of eight police witnesses were intended 
to be called at trial. Witness statements were originally directed to be exchanged in January 2013, 
but the defendant's solicitor encountered problems partly through pressures of work and partly as a 
result of the Christmas holiday season, bad weather, and operational commitments of the witnesses. 
Pressures of work of course are not good reasons. Practical problems in obtaining the statements 
were probably good reasons for not being able to comply with the original order, but their force was 
spent thereafter. 
 
In February 2013 an unless order was made for these witness statements to be served by 12 March 
2013. On 12 March 2013 the defendant's solicitor emailed two witness statements to the claimant 
(who was a litigant in person), and also sent them by post. Evidence was accepted that these were 
received by the claimant on 13 March 2013
94
. Despite a protest in an email from the claimant that 
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sent, plus four more. Then on 5 June 2013, just five days before the trial, the defendant issued a 
second application to be allowed to rely on two further witness statements. 
 
Both applications were considered by the trial judge on the first day of the trial. He considered the 
nine factors in the old r 3.9(1), and also the terms of the new r 3.9(1). He distinguished the case from 
many breach of contract claims in that this was an action against the police in which serious 
allegations of race discrimination were being made against the individual police officers. He pointed 
to the fact it was not the fault of the individual officers that their statements were served late, and 
felt that it was important that they should be given the opportunity to explain their actions to the 
court as their reputations were in question. Relief from the sanction in r 32.10 was granted in 
respect of all eight witnesses on terms as to costs. 
 
An appeal by the claimant was allowed. This was not a case of trivial breaches, and there was no 
good reason for the default. While the court will not lightly interfere with a case management 
decisions
95
, if the message sent out by Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd is not to be 
undermined, Richards LJ said it was vital that decisions under r 3.9 which fail to follow the robust 
approach laid down in that case should not be allowed to stand. Failure to follow that approach 
constitutes an error of principle entitling an appeal court to interfere with the discretionary decision 
of the first instance judge. It is likely also to lead to a decision that is plainly wrong, justifying 
intervention on that basis too
96
. Further, considerations such as the reputational issues raised by the 
litigation were regarded as having no more than a limited role to play on an application for relief 
from sanctions
97
. 
 
The appeal was allowed on this basis in respect of all eight statements. The two statements served a 
day late caused the greatest concern. On the face of it this was no more than a trivial breach
98
 within 
the meaning of Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd. Although this is not very clear, Richards LJ 
seems to have taken the much later provision of the other six statements as  aggravating the 
seriousness of the one day breach in respect of the first two statements
99
. A more convincing reason 
for refusing relief for these two statements is that the application for relief was not made 
promptly
100
. It has to be questioned whether either of these reasons come anywhere near the high 
threshold required for interfering with a case management decision on an appeal. 
 
An unreported Court of Appeal decision, Wheeler v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary 
(18 December 2013), was a case where both parties failed to file costs schedules in breach of PD 44, 
para 9.5(4). This meant costs had to be referred to a detailed assessment rather than being 
summarily assessed at the end of the appeal hearing. Applying Mitchell v News Group Newspapers 
Ltd, the successful respondent was penalised by ordering him to pay the costs of the detailed 
assessment. This is effectively the penalty suggested by PD 44, para 9.6. 
 
Durrant v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset and Wheeler v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire 
Constabulary show Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd is of general application in relation to 
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relief from sanctions and is not limited to applications under r 3.14. Durrant establishes that Mitchell 
v News Group Newspapers Ltd governs both applications for relief from sanctions, and the reverse 
position where an appellant complains that a procedural judge has failed to apply a sufficiently 
tough stance to rule compliance. A further case, Norseman Holdings Ltd v Warwick Court (Harold 
Hill) Management Co Ltd
101
, which was about the status of an undertaking intimated to the court on 
behalf of a solicitor by counsel, shows Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd being used as 
authority for the general proposition that parties have to conduct litigation in accordance with the 
rules in order to ensure expensive interlocutory skirmishes become a thing of the past.  
 
Relief from the sanction in an unless order was granted in Adlington v Els International Lawyers 
LLP
102
 in group litigation where the order required each claimant to file particulars of claim with 
specified information and statements of truth. The deadline was met by most of the 134 claimants, 
but seven of the claimants were on holiday and needed an additional four days. Draft particulars 
were served on time. It was held that the breach was trivial within the meaning of Mitchell v News 
Group Newspapers Ltd because the failing was one of form rather than substance, alternatively 
because the deadline had been missed narrowly, and in either case, the application for relief had 
been made promptly. Alternatively, the judge held that finding seven of the claimants away on 
holiday was a good reason within the meaning of Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd. This reads 
like a judge desperately trying to fit a case into the exacting criteria laid down by Mitchell v News 
Group Newspapers Ltd. 
 
Relief from the sanction in what used to be CPR, r 44.3B, for failing to give notice of CFA funding on 
form N251 was granted in Forstater v Python (Monty) Pictures Ltd
103
. The relevant information had 
been given by letter rather than on the prescribed form, which was seen as a matter of form rather 
than substance. There was a passing reference to Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd, which was 
decided after argument but before the decision. 
 
Relief was refused in SC DG Petrol SRL v Vitol Broking Ltd
104
 for failure to comply with an unless order 
extending the time previously given to provide security for costs. The breach was not trivial. The 
reasons advanced related to problems in selling certain assets to raise the security that had been 
ordered, but failed to cover other means that might have been available to the claimant to raise 
funds from other sources. As such it had failed to establish a good reason for non-compliance. The 
case shows that detailed evidence is required to establish grounds amounting to a good reason, and 
easy points (even if they are explained at great length) will not suffice. 
 
On the question of the wider impact of the default on other litigants, the judge, Robin Knowles QC at 
[29], said: "I respectfully offer the observation that there are limits to the contribution that a party, 
especially a non-defaulting party, can usefully make in evidence or argument in respect of 
circumstances extending beyond the case in hand - for example on what is needed 'to enforce 
compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.' This is pre-eminently an area for the judge." 
So far as this goes this must be true, but it is suggested that this misunderstands the "resources" 
dimension that judges are enjoined to consider by the new r 3.9(1) and Mitchell v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd. This is really about the general effect on the civil justice system and other litigants. 
It was probably rather misleading that the specific instance of the asbestos disease claims was raised 
in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd. This was intended to be no more than an example of the 
deleterious effects of court time being taken up with hearings over non-compliance. It was not 
intended to impose an obligation on the court or the parties to adduce evidence of the direct impact 
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of such hearings on other cases in the relevant court or in the diary of the particular judge. In any 
event, it would be quite wrong if one defaulting party were to be given relief from sanctions because 
it was their good fortune that the court happened to be free to hear the application for relief, 
whereas in an identical case of default relief were to be refused because there happened to be 
evidence that particular cases had to be relisted. It might also be mentioned that investigating and 
arguing over the actual effects on other litigants would be an additional unnecessary complication 
and expense, which is the last thing that applications for relief from sanctions need. 
 
In Karbhari v Ahmed
105
 the claim was for the return of very large sums alleged to have been paid to 
the defendant to invest in the Dubai property market on terms generating a 100% return on the 
money invested. The defence and the defendant's witness statement were to the effect no monies 
had been received by him. On the second day of the trial the defendant applied to amend his 
defence and replace his witness statement to say that he had received four of the cheques, but they 
were received for onward transmission to a company investing in Dubai. The sanction for late service 
of witness statements is set out in CPR, r 32.10, and is that the witnesses cannot be called at trial 
without the court's permission. Applying Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd this was not a trivial 
breach, and Turner J held that the defendant's stated reason for the about face, to protect others 
from money laundering investigations, was a thoroughly bad reason. Relief was refused. In fact the 
judge went further, because this was not a change brought about by a mistake, but was deliberate, 
and involved irreconcilable documents all verified by statements of truth. The defence was also 
struck out as an abuse of process, and the case was referred to the Economic Crime Unit. 
 
Prescribed Sanctions 
One of the key elements of the decision in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd was that the 
prescribed sanction for not filing a costs budget set out in CPR, r 3.14, represented the considered 
view of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee as to what constituted a proportionate sanction for 
breach
106
. With respect, as indicated above, this is unsustainable. If this was correct it would be 
possible to discern a clear hierarchy of sanctions prescribed in the CPR, with the most draconian 
being reserved for the most serious varieties of defaults. The sanctions imposed by the CPR for the 
key stages in litigation are set out in the following table. 
 
Table: Sanctions prescribed by the CPR 
Step in litigation CPR provision Prescribed sanction for default 
Pre-action protocols PD Pre-action Conduct para 4.6 Range of sanctions, including 
staying proceedings until 
prescribed steps are taken, and 
costs and interest penalties 
Serve claim form r 7.6 No extension = claim defeated 
Serve particulars of claim r 7.4 None 
Acknowledge service / serve 
defence 
r 12.3 No automatic sanction, but 
claimant able to enter default 
judgment 
Other statements of case / 
further information 
Part 16 None 
Directions questionnaires in 
designated money claims 
r 26.3(7A) Statement of case struck out 
Directions questionnaires in r 26.3(8) Court may: 
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other claims (a) order directions; 
(b) strike out the claim; 
(c) strike out the defence; or 
(d) list for a CMC. 
Disclosure reports r 31.5(3) None 
Costs budgets r 3.14 Limit costs to court fees 
Inadequate attendance at CMC r 29.3 / PD 29 para 5.2(3) Normally a wasted costs order 
Disclosure of documents relied 
upon 
r 31.21 Defaulting party cannot rely on 
the documents unless the court 
gives permission 
Disclosure of documents 
helpful to other parties 
rr 31.5 / 31.6 None 
Witness statements r 32.10 Witness may not be called to 
give oral evidence unless the 
court gives permission 
Experts' reports r 35.13 Report may not be used or 
expert may not be called to 
give oral evidence unless the 
court gives permission 
Short notice of interim 
application 
r 23.4 None. 
May be allowed to make the 
application orally (PD 23A, para 
2.10) 
Non payment of directions / 
listing / hearing fees 
rr 3.7(4), 3.7A(6), 3.7B(3) Automatically struck out 
Failing to lodge trial bundles r 39.5 None 
Not ready for trial PD 28 para 5.4; PD 29 para 7.4 Detailed guidance, but includes: 
(a) possibly depriving a party of 
right to raise or contest an 
issue or to rely on evidence 
(b) disallowing costs 
(c) refusing adjournment 
Non-attendance of one party at 
trial 
r 39.3 Proceed in absence of the 
party, or strike out 
Non-attendance of all parties at 
trial 
r 39.3(1)(a) May strike out proceedings 
Appeal out of time rr 52.4 and 52.6; PD 52B paras 
3.1 to 3.3 
None 
Schedule of costs for summary 
assessment 
PD 44, para 9.5 and 9.6 Taken into account in deciding 
what order to make about costs 
Detailed assessment, 
commencement 
r 47.8 Loss of interest on costs (r 
47.8(3). 
If paying party applies for an 
order under r 47.8(1), court 
may make an unless order (r 
47.8(2)) 
 
It will be seen from the table that automatic striking out, the most draconian sanction, is prescribed 
for: 
(a) Not filing directions questionnaires in designated money claims; and 
(b) Non-payment of court fees. 
Directions questionnaires and court fees are not the most serious defaults, but they attract the 
harshest sanctions. This cannot be because the Civil Procedure Rule Committee felt automatic 
striking out was a proportionate sanction for breach, but must be a purely pragmatic approach of 
terminating claims if the relevant parties do not pay or comply, with relief being contemplated if and 
when they do. 
 
The court has a discretion to strike out, but has other options, for: 
(a) Not filing directions questionnaires in non-designated money claims; 
(b) Non-attendance at trial. 
 
Greater impact on other litigants is likely to result from a failure to file directions questionnaires in 
non-designated money claims, which are more likely to result in case management hearings to sort 
out the problem, than in designated money claims where a more stringent sanction applies 
automatically. Other types of default that inevitably have an effect on other litigants include not 
giving proper notice of interim applications resulting in adjournments, not being ready for trial, and 
being inadequately prepared for case management hearings so they have to be adjourned. None of 
these have striking out as the prescribed sanction, even of (say) just the interim application. Only a 
wasted costs order is deemed appropriate for needing to adjourn a CMC. 
 
Defaults that have the largest impact on costs include not being ready for trial, inadequate 
disclosure, and not complying with directions on witness statements and experts. The sanction in r 
31.10 on disclosure only affects documents that defaulting party wishes to rely on at trial. The most 
expensive defaults cover documents helpful to the innocent party, for which there is no prescribed 
sanction. While there are severe sanctions for breach of directions on witness statements and 
experts' reports, these apply unless the court otherwise orders (which will be governed by the 
Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd principles), and are not as severe as striking out. 
 
The sanctions on late commencement of detailed assessment are light compared to the others. This 
is because they are often imposed immediately, with limited scope for putting the default right later 
combined with an application for relief from sanctions. 
 
With judges being encouraged to treat the prescribed sanctions as the considered view on 
proportionate sanctions for different types of default, it is essential that the whole system of 
prescribed sanctions be reviewed and revised. A coherent approach would result in a system of 
graduated sanctions where minor defaults
107
 attract light sanctions, and the most damaging defaults 
attract the most draconian. 
 
Consistency with other Principles 
Gaining relief from sanctions under the Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd principles should 
form part of a consistent system with the criteria used to grant relief for other types of procedural 
failure. There are developed sets of principles dealing with problems such as renewing claim forms, 
setting aside default judgments
108
, striking out for abuse of process
109
, amending statements of 
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case
110
 and setting aside judgments following non-attendance
111
. These are only examples. 
Obviously it would be unattractive for certain types of procedural default (such as failing to serve a 
defence in time, which is governed by CPR, Part 13) were to be more readily forgiven than others of 
equal seriousness (such as failing to serve particulars of claim in time, which is governed by Mitchell 
v News Group Newspapers Ltd). It would also be unattractive for procedural defaults to be met with 
unyielding sanctions when other defaults, such as missing the limitation period
112
, are forgiven far 
more readily. 
 
Avoiding Sanctions by the Back Door 
Striking out a claim may be thought to end the litigation, but in many cases this is not so. There may 
be an obvious professional negligence claim against the lawyers responsible for the default. In many 
cases a claimant will be able to start fresh proceedings alleging the same cause of action because the 
limitation period has not expired
113
. Starting a second claim after earlier proceedings have been 
struck out may be an abuse of process, with the pre-CPR caselaw on this saying that a second claim 
would normally be an abuse of process if striking out was for intentional and contumelious default, 
unless there was a satisfactory explanation for failing to obey the original order
114
. 
 
Whether this can be transplanted into the new code formed by the CPR may be doubtful
115
. It would 
also be inconsistent with the approach to second claim cases under the Limitation Act 1980, s 33
116
. 
However, the Janov v Morris principles were loyally applied in Hall v Ministry of Defence
117
, where 
the second claim was restored on appeal because a failure to pay the costs ordered in the first claim 
was not intentional or contumelious, nor was this a case of wholesale disregard of court orders. 
Phillips J said there had to be something transforming the delay into an abuse of process
118
, for 
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 The ground specified by CPR, r 3.4(2)(b). These problems might be avoided by applying to strike out the 
second claim under r 3.4(2)(c), that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court 
example evidence that the claimant had lost interest in the claim. There is an obvious difference in 
the approach to the initial breach exemplified by Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd and the 
Janov v Morris principles on striking out second claims. As a result that are likely to be many cases 
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Striking out also creates a mis-match between the effects on claimants and defendants. If Hall v 
Ministry of Defence is correct, claimants may be able to start again. Claimants in difficulties may also 
seek to avoid the consequences of Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd by discontinuing and 
accepting the costs consequences in r 38.6, and then starting again. Defendants simply lose the case. 
 
Lesser sanctions also create problems of defaulting parties avoiding the effects of the sanction by 
the back door. Richards LJ in Durrant v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset (where the defendant 
was prevented from calling witnesses) was alive to this, pointing out that the claim depended in part 
on the claimant's own credibility, which the defendant was entitled to challenge at trial; and there 
was documentary material on the basis of which the defendant could properly mount such a 
challenge even though the Chief Constable was unable to call any witnesses on his own behalf
119
. It 
was probably wider than this. All the sanction did was to prevent the defendant from calling the 
police officers as witnesses. They had provided signed witness statements. These were hearsay 
evidence, and hearsay is never rendered inadmissible purely on the ground that it is hearsay
120
. 
 
Of course there is a discretionary power to exclude otherwise admissible evidence, but using CPR r 
32.1 for this purpose would involve a considerable extension of its present ambit
121
, and would 
involve the need for a further interim application. A similar problem was recognised by Turner J in 
Karbhari v Ahmed
122
 (where a replacement witness statement was disallowed), because it was 
inevitable that cross examination would afford the defendant the opportunity to introduce by the 
back door the evidence which the court had refused to admit through the front door. Patently false 
statements of truth gave the judge scope to prevent this by striking out the defence as an abuse of 
process. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd is the most important decision on civil procedure since 
American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd
123
 almost 40 years ago. In fact Mitchell v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd marks a watershed in civil justice. Directions are now made to be obeyed. Rules and 
practice directions mean what they say. Litigators need to organise themselves so that they are in a 
position to comply in all respects with the procedural timetable, because little or no mercy will be 
shown if they fail. A culture change was promised when the civil justice reforms came into force on 1 
April 2013. The extent of the change was no more that nascent in the wording of the rules as 
enacted. It has been brought into sharp focus by Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd. 
 
A clear message to the profession was the intended purpose of the decision. The problem is whether 
it is the right message. A tough approach to compliance has worked in other jurisdictions, such as 
Singapore (although views are to the effect that it took about 20 years for the new culture to 
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become accepted).  Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd goes further than the approach 
promoted by Sir Rupert Jackson, and does not seem to fit comfortably with the overall scheme of 
the CPR. A tougher, more robust, approach to compliance did not demand a test that limits relief 
from sanctions to trivial breaches and those where there is a good reason arising from circumstances 
absolutely beyond the control of the defaulting party. 
 
Beyond the truly trivial, defaults vary in seriousness, and excuses and reasons shade from those 
totally beyond the control of the defaulting party, through ones which involve a choice in the 
deployment of limited resources, to those involving pure indolence or deliberate default. Refusing to 
give relief for moderate defaults where the reasons for breach are poor to middling will either 
reform the profession, or will lead to the end of party co-operation. The hope is that the profession 
will reform and treat deadlines seriously. The law of unintended consequences may mean lawyers 
end up making a great many more applications than hitherto. With sanctions being deemed to be 
reasonable and proportionate unless appealed at the time, that might be exactly what solicitors do if 
unless orders are made with draconian consequences for breach. Rather than giving consent, 
opponents are likely to leave parties in difficulties to the mercy of the courts. Rather than doing their 
best to comply, albeit a little late, solicitors may as a matter of course make applications to extend 
time whenever there is a risk of breach. Instead of doing the work properly, there may be a 
temptation to serve documents as they are in order to meet the deadline. It may be good tactics to 
pour money into steps in the litigation process with tight deadlines in the hope the other side will 
not be able to match the expenditure or meet the deadline. The fear is that we may have turned the 
clock back to 1874. 
 
A better approach would have been to follow the recommendations of Sir Rupert Jackson. As he 
stated in Fred Perry (Holdings) Ltd v Brands Plaza Trading Ltd, "... litigants who substantially 
disregard court orders or the requirements of the Civil Procedure Rules will receive significantly less 
indulgence than hitherto.
124
" This reflects a middle course that adopts a less tolerant and robust 
approach to non-compliance, rather than one with very little tolerance. This would have taken into 
account all the various shades of seriousness of the various defaults that tend to arise, and required 
the court to find a just outcome taking into account the various shades of reasons that may be 
proffered by defaulting parties, together with the effects on delay and court and party resources. 
However, the Court of Appeal has chosen a different path. The question is whether the legal 
profession is able to heed the clear message that has been sent. 
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